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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Matthew O. Brooks, after being stopped while driving for supposedly failing to 
signal in violation of Idaho Code § 49-808(2), was accused of committing felony 
possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence 
obtained by the State as a result of an unlawful search and seizure of Mr. Brooks and 
his vehicle. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Brooks asserted that the traffic 
stop of his vehicle was unlawful because, although the stop had been based on 
Mr. Brooks' supposed violation of I.C. § 49-808(2), he never actually committed a 
violation of that statute. The district court gave the parties time to file supplemental 
briefing on that issue, and after reviewing the supplemental briefs, it denied the motion 
to suppress. The district court also denied Mr. Brooks' subsequent motion to reconsider 
the denial of the motion to suppress. Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement 
preserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress, Mr. Brooks then 
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The district court granted a 
withheld judgment and placed Mr. Brooks on probation for a period of three years. 
On appeal, Mr. Brooks asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress, because the stop was in violation of his constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. His appeal centers on the issue of how 
long one must signal a lane change while driving on a controlled-access highway. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Trooper Blake Higley of the Idaho State Police testified that he was on duty in his 
patrol vehicle on Interstate 84 in Canyon County, when he saw a blue car traveling 
eastbound on the highway. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.5, Ls.1-7, p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.18.) 
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The blue car caught his attention because it was driving approximately sixty miles per 
hour in a seventy-five mile per hour zone. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.10, Ls.1B-22.) Trooper 
Higley decided to get on the interstate and follow the blue car. 1 (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, 
p.12, Ls.6-12.) When the blue car passed into a sixty-five mile per hour zone, its speed 
dropped to approximately fifty-five miles per hour. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.12, Ls.12-25.) 
Traveling fifty-five miles an hour is about eighty feet per second. (R., p.B5 & n.1; see 
Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.19, Ls.1-6.) 
The trooper subsequently saw the blue car make a lane change from the left 
lane. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.9-12.) According to Trooper Higley, "The vehicle 
department and Idaho Code requires a vehicle making a lane change, left or right, 
entering an on ramp from the interstate requires them to signal for not less than five 
continuous seconds." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.13-17.) Trooper Higley was 
referring to I.C. § 49-BOB(2). (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.13, Ls.21-23.) However, the trooper 
observed the driver of the car "make a lane change, activate his signal approximately 
less than two seconds, and move over in the slow lane." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, 
Ls.1B-20.) 
Trooper Higley then initiated a traffic stop and pulled over the blue car. (See 
Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.1B.) He approached on the passenger side of the 
vehicle, helped the driver, Mr. Brooks, push down the window, and looked inside the 
car. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.15, Ls.3-9, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.10.) The lane change was 
the only reason Trooper Higley pulled over the blue car. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.14, 
1 However, traveling sixty miles per hour in a seventy-five miles per hour zone was not 
necessarily illegal. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.11, Ls.16-1B.) Trooper Higley agreed with the 
statement that, "We encourage people not to necessarily drive the limit." (Tr., Aug. 16, 
2012, p.13, Ls.6-B.) 
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Ls.16-18.) When he approached Mr. Brooks, and told him why he pulled him over, 
Troop Higley said it was because of Mr. Brooks' sudden and abrupt lane change. 
(Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.39, Ls.3-6.) 
When Trooper Higley looked inside the car, he immediately saw on the 
passenger seat an open cigarette box with "a couple of cigarettes in it. More 
importantly than that there was a small plastic bag which contained a clear crystal 
substance." (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.15, Ls.1-16; see Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.24, Ls.6-12.) 
Trooper Higley believed that the crystal substance inside the plastic was 
methamphetamine. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.16, Ls.13-17.) He then seized the cigarette 
box. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.17, Ls.13-18.) Before he reached in and seized the 
cigarette box, he smelled the odor of marijuana and saw a piece of drug paraphernalia 
visible in the center console. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.17, L.19 - p.18, L.7.) Trooper 
Higley then arrested Mr. Brooks. (See R., p.8; Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.38, Ls.13-18.) 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Brooks had committed the 
crime of possession of a controlled substance, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-
2732(c)(1). (R., pp.9-10.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable 
cause and bound Mr. Brooks over to the district court. (R., pp.14-1S.) The State 
subsequently filed an Information charging Mr. Brooks with the above offense. 
(R., pp.16-17.) He entered a plea of not guilty. (R., p.19.) 
Mr. Brooks then filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order suppressing all 
evidence obtained by the State as a result of an unlawful search and seizure of 
Mr. Brooks and his vehicle. (R., pp.21-2S.) He also filed a Memorandum of Law in 
Support of the Motion to Suppress, requesting that the district court suppress the 
evidence based upon legal precedents including the Fourth Amendment of the United 
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States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.26-32.) The 
State subsequently filed an Objection to Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R., pp.34-39.) 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Brooks asserted that I.C. § 49-
808(2) required a signal for not less than five seconds before turning only when a 
vehicle is both on a controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position.2 
(Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.40, Ls.2-10.) In any other instance, the statute only required a 
signal for not less than 100 feet before turning. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.41, Ls.2-3.) 
Thus, Mr. Brooks asserted that he should never have been pulled over, the resulting 
search was illegal, and all the evidence that was gathered in his case should be 
suppressed. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.43, Ls.10-15.) 
The district court, because it felt that the issue of the interpretation of I.C. § 49-
808(2) had not necessarily been raised in the briefing, gave the parties time to submit 
further briefing on the language of Section 49-808(2) and whether it had been violated 
under the facts of this case. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.44, Ls.17-21, p.45, Ls.1-8.) Both 
parties then filed supplemental briefing. (R., pp.44-58, 64-71, 74-81; see R., p.84.) 
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision upon Motion to 
Suppress, denying the motion to suppress. (R., pp.84-91.) The district court stated 
that, if the stop were valid, the warrantless search of the car and seizure of evidence 
would be justified under the plain view doctrine. (See R., pp.85-86.) At issue was 
whether "the stop [was] valid so that the officer was properly in a position to observe a 
particular area." (R., p.86.) 
2 Mr. Brooks agreed that Interstate 84 was a "controlled access highway" for purposes 
of the statute. (Tr., Aug. 16,2012, p.39, L.22 - pAO, L.1.) 
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The district court then stated that "Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that 
drivers on Interstate Highway 84 are required to use a turn signal for five (5) seconds 
before changing lanes. Indeed, this Court and other district courts have interpreted the 
statute to so require." (R., p.88 (citing State v. Diaz, Canyon County No. CR 2012-
8900*C; State v. locolucci, Canyon County Nos. CR 2012-800*C and CR 2012-719*C).) 
"That is, I.C. § 49-808(2) requires that on controlled-access highways the signal shall be 
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." (R., p.88.) The district court 
noted that Mr. Brooks stipulated that he was driving on a controlled-access highway. 
(R., p.88.) 
The district court also determined that "if Trooper Higley's belief that [Mr. Brooks] 
was required to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds turns out to be incorrect, his 
mistake would most likely be characterized as a mistake of law." (R., p.89.) Because 
Idaho precedent had not established whether a mistake of law was unreasonable per 
se, or whether a court should instead use the standard for mistakes of fact and ask if 
the mistake of law was objectively reasonable, the district court decided to use the 
reasonableness standard. (R., p.89.) According to the district court, "Trooper Higley 
had a good faith belief that [Mr. Brooks] was required to use his turn signal for five (5) 
seconds and considering the application of this statute by this Court and [another court], 
his conduct was that of a reasonable person acting under the facts known at the time." 
(R., p.89.) 
Additionally, the district court did not "find any legal precedent to support 
[Mr. Brooks'] assertion that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face." 
(R., p.89.) Further, Mr. Brooks' "argument that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot 
5 
understand the plain meaning of the statute is unpersuasive." (R., p.90.) Thus, the 
district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.90.) 
Mr. Brooks then filed a Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to 
Suppress.3 (R., pp.105-10.) The district court later issued an Order Denying Motion to 
Reconsider. (R., pp.116-20.) In the order, the district court stated that "this Court reads 
the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) to require that drivers on controlled access 
highways must use their turn signal continuously for five (5) seconds before moving 
right or left." (R., p.117.) "Because this Court finds that I.C. § 49-808(2) required 
[Mr. Brooks] to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds, the stop and subsequent search 
(under the plain view exception as stipulated to by the parties) were reasonable and 
Trooper Higley was acting lawfully." (R., p.118.) 
The district court then stated, "While this Court's Memorandum Decision did 
discuss a hypothetical scenario in which Trooper Higley had made a mistake, Trooper 
Higley was not mistaken." (R., p.119.) According to the district court, the trooper 
correctly interpreted the law, and only if an appellate court determined otherwise would 
the discussion of mistake of fact or mistake of law apply. (R., p.119.) The district court 
stated that "this discussion is merely dictum." (R., p.119.) 
Mr. Brooks later entered into a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would 
plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance in this case and the State would 
dismiss the consolidated misdemeanor charges in a separate case, Canyon County No. 
CR 2012-12215*C. (R., pp.137-41; see R., pp.142-48.) So long as Mr. Brooks had no 
3 Mr. Brooks also filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, requesting permission to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.102-04.) After the 
district court denied the motion to reconsider, it issued an Order Denying Motion for 
Permission to Appeal. (R., pp.121- 23.) 
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prior felony offenses, the State would recommend probation. (R., p.137.) Mr. Brooks' 
guilty plea would be conditional, and he would appeal the denial of the motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.137-38.) The district court accepted Mr. Brooks' guilty plea. (See 
R., p.139.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that Mr. Brooks be placed on 
probation, with an underlying unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed. 
(R., pp.152-54.) Mr. Brooks recommended a withheld judgment with three years of 
probation. (R., p.153.) The district court granted a withheld judgment and placed 
Mr. Brooks on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.153, 160-63.) 
Mr. Brooks then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.164-67.) 
7 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brooks' motion to suppress, because the 
traffic stop was in violation of Mr. Brooks' constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brooks' Motion To Suppress, Because The 
Traffic Stop Was In Violation Of Mr. Brooks' Constitutional Right To Be Free From 
Unreasonable Searches And Seizures 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Brooks asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress, because the traffic stop was in violation of his constitutional right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The stop was not justified at its inception 
because, while Trooper Higley's sole reason for initiating the stop was his belief that 
Mr. Brooks had committed a traffic violation by failing to signal a lane change for five 
seconds, supposedly in violation of I.C. § 49-808(2), under the plain language of 
Section 49-808(2) Mr. Brooks did not violate that statute. I.C. § 49-808(2) is an 
unambiguous statute requiring a five-second signal only when a driver is both on a 
controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position. Because Mr. Brooks did 
not violate Section 49-808(2), and Trooper Higley offered no other reason for initiating 
the stop, the stop was not justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion. 
Alternatively, if I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in favor of 
Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. If the statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor, he 
did not violate the statute and the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at its 
inception. In any event, Trooper Higley's misapprehension of Section 49-808(2) was a 
mistake of law that rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
Thus, the law requires that any evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful 
traffic stop be suppressed. The district court therefore erred when it denied Mr. Brooks' 
motion to suppress. 
9 
B. Applicable Law And Standard Of Review 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right of the people to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures conducted by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Idaho Const Art. I, § 17. The federal safeguard has been incorporated through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to apply 
to the states. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,810 (2009) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643,655 (1961)). "Evidence obtained in violation of the amendment generally may not 
be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal government action." Id. at 810-11. 
This "exclusionary rule" applies to both "evidence obtained directly from the illegal 
government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original 
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 811. "The test is 'whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (alteration in original)). In other words, 
"evidence that is suffiCiently attenuated from the illegal government action may be 
admitted at tria/." Id. "When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds 
that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the 
burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. 
"A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003). A 
routine traffic stop, typically of limited scope and duration, is analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because it is more analogous to 
10 
an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Id. "Under Terry, an investigative 
detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify 
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." Id. Under this standard, the "totality of the circumstances then known to the 
officer ... must show a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative 
detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the 
first place." Id. A traffic violation, as an unlawful activity, in itself justifies a traffic stop. 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,553 (1998). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has outlined the standard of review for a motion to 
suppress as follows: "When reviewing a motion to suppress, the standard of review is 
bifurcated. This Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. This Court freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,485-86 (2009). 
C. The Stop Was Not Justified By Reasonable Suspicion At Its Inception. Because 
Mr. Brooks Did Not Violate I.C. § 49-808(2) 
Here, the question is whether Mr. Brooks committed a traffic violation-namely 
the violation of I.C. § 49-808(2) invoked by Trooper Higley as the sole reason for the 
stop-that would justify the stop at its inception. Mr. Brooks asserts that the stop was 
not justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, because he did not violate Section 
49-808(2). 
11 
According to the district court, Mr. Brooks signaled a lane change for about two 
seconds, which meant he signaled for approximately 160 feet at a speed of fifty-five 
miles per hour. (R., p.85 & n.1.) The district court determined that Mr. Brooks violated 
I.C. § 49-808(2) because he only signaled for about two seconds when he made the 
lane change on Interstate 84, while the statute requires a turn signal of not less than five 
seconds on a controlled-access highway like Interstate 84. However, the plain and 
unambiguous language of I.C. § 49-808(2) requires a signal of not less than five 
seconds only where a vehicle driver is both on a controlled-access highway and turning 
from a parked position. Thus, Mr. Brooks did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2). 
The relevant portion of Section 49-808 provides the following: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 
given continuously to warn other traffic. On control/ed-access highways 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, 
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning. 
I.C. § 49-808(2). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation. "The interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." 
Verska v. Saint A!phonsus Reg'! Med. Cfr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe 
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it, but simply follows the law as written.,,4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "We 
have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history 
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The 
asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning." Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Appel/ate courts do not have authority to revise or 
void "an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce 
absurd results when construed as written." Id. at 896. "If the statute as written is 
socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judiciaL" Id. at 
893 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The district court interpreted I.C. § 49-808(2) as requiring "that on controlled-
access highways the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) 
seconds." (R., p.88.) Mr. Brooks submits that the district court's interpretation of the 
statute ignores the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute, 
specifically the provision that "[o]n controlled-access highways and before turning from 
a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) 
seconds." See I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added). 
The district court's interpretation treats "and" as disjunctive rather than 
conjunctive. However, for purposes of statutory interpretation, Idaho's appel/ate courts 
have consistently interpreted the word "and" in the conjunctive sense. For example, in a 
case involving the interpretation of a statute governing auditorium districts, the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he literal language of the statute requires that an 
4 "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable interpretation." 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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auditorium district 'build, operate, maintain, market and manage' public facilities." 
Ameritellnns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Cmty. Ctr. Dist., 146 Idaho 202, 
205 (2008) (quoting I.C. § 67-4902) (emphasis in original). "The word 'and' is a 
'conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea is to be added to or taken 
along with the first.'" Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990). The Court 
then stated, "The legislature's inclusion of the word 'and' indicates that an auditorium 
district is one that performs all of the listed functions in the statute." Id. 
The Ameritel Inns Court construed the statute at issue as a whole, explaining 
that, "If the legislature wanted to make it clear that an auditorium could choose to only 
market public facilities, then it could have used the words 'andlor,' as it did when 
describing the purposes that auditorium district facilities must serve." Id. (quoting 
I.C. § 67-4902). Thus, the Court held "that an auditorium district must build, operate, 
maintain, market, and manage a public facility. An auditorium district cannot simply 
market existing facilities within its borders." Id. 
Similarly, in a case involving a statute governing the reinstatement of suspended 
driver's licenses, the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the statute's 
language providing that '''the court shall suspend all his driving privileges immediately 
for one hundred eighty (1BO) days unless it finds that the police officer did not have 
probable cause to stop and request him to take the test.'" In re Brink, 117 Idaho 55, 56 
n.2 (1990) (quoting I.C. § 1B-B002(4)(b)). In Brink, the State argued that the statute 
should be liberally construed, which "would require that the word 'and' be replaced with 
the word 'or.'" Id. at 56. "Under this interpretation, probable cause would only be 
required at the time of the stop or at the time of the request but not both." /d. 
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The Brink Court stated that, "The plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory 
words in question is dispositive of the State's argument that by substituting the word 'or' 
for the word 'and' we would better fulfill the legislature's desire to enhance safety on 
Idaho's roads." Id. "Appellate courts do not have the authority to perform the type of 
open sentence surgery that the State requests. Judicial construction of the legislature's 
words is only warranted when the legislature's words do not have a plain and ordinary 
meaning." Id. (citation omitted). The Court continued: "The words 'the court shall 
suspend all his driving privileges immediately for one hundred eighty (1BO) days unless 
it finds that the police officer did not have probable cause to stop and request him to 
take the test ... ' found in I.C. § 1B-B002(4)(b) have a plain and ordinary meaning." Id. 
at 56-57 (quoting I.C. § 18-B002(4)(b) (emphasis in original). "The word 'and', as used 
in 'probable cause to stop "and" request', is plainly conjunctive. It joins together the 
words 'stop' and 'request'." Id. at 57. Thus, the Court held that "[t]he result is that the 
officer must have probable cause to stop the driver and probable cause to request that 
the driver submit to a blood alcohol content test." Id. (emphasis in original). "The 
State's requested revision would transform the phrase into one that is disjunctive rather 
than conjunctive. Healthy language of the legislature needs no incision by judicial 
pen." Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also interpreted "and" in the conjunctive sense. 
For example, in a case involving the interpretation of the statute authorizing sentencing 
courts to impose probation, the Court of Appeals focused on the provision of the statute 
empowering a court to "[s]uspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment 
or at any time during the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the defendant 
on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient." 
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State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 830 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting I.C. § 19-2601) 
(emphasis in original). The Court concluded, "The conjunctive 'and' in this subsection of 
I.C. § 19-2601 suggests that the suspension of a sentence must always be 
accompanied by probation." Id. 
Conversely, Idaho appellate courts have interpreted the word "or" in the 
disjunctive sense. See, e.g., Filer Mut. Tel. Co. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 256, 
261 (1955) ("[T]he use of the word 'or' in Section 63-105(15), I.C., is as a disjunctive 
that marks an alternative generally corresponding to 'either."'); State v. Rivera, 131 
Idaho 8, 10 (Cl. App. 1988) ("The word 'or' is defined as 'a function word to indicate (1) 
an alternative between different or unlike things, states, or actions ... ; (2) [a] choice 
between alternative things, states, or courses .... "'). 
Thus, after giving the literal words of I.C. § 49-808(2) their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning and construing the statute as a whole, Section 49-808(2) requires a 
signal for not less than five seconds only if both: (1) the person giving the signal is on a 
controlled-access highway; and (2) the person giving the signal is turning from a parked 
position. I.C. § 49-808(2). ''The word 'and' is a 'conjunction connecting words or 
phrases expressing the idea is to be added to or taken along with the first. '" Amerite/ 
Inns, 146 Idaho at 205. The legislature's inclusion of the word "and" in the language at 
issue here indicates that both requirements must be met before a five-second signal 
must be given. See id. Put otherwise, the word "and," as used in the language "[o]n 
controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position," is conjunctive 
and therefore joins together the phrases "on controlled-access highways" and "before 
turning from a parked position." See Brink, 117 Idaho at 57. The conjunctive "and" 
suggests that being "on a controlled-access highway" must always be accompanied by 
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"before turning from a parked position" for the five-second signal requirement to apply. 
See Gamino, 148 Idaho at 830. 
Construing the statute as a whole reinforces the conclusion that both the 
controlled-access highway and parked position requirements of the statute must be met 
before the five-second signal requirement applies. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. 
Subsection (1) of Section 49-808 provides that, "No person shall turn a vehicle onto a 
highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a 
highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without 
giving an appropriate signal." I.C. § 49-808(1). The legislature's use of the disjunctive 
"or" in that subsection indicates a person must be able to make the movement with 
reasonable safety and give an appropriate signal before making anyone of three 
alternative movements: (1) turning a vehicle onto a highway; (2) moving a vehicle right 
or left upon a highway; or (3) exiting from a highway. See Filer Mut. Tel., 76 Idaho at 
256; Rivera, 131 Idaho at 10. Thus, if the legislature wanted to make it clear that a five-
second signal was required if the driver was only on a controlled-access highway, or 
was only before turning from a parked position, then it could have used the word "or" in 
the relevant passage of § 49-808(2), as it did when describing the alternative 
movements in § 49-808(1). See Ameritellnns, 146 Idaho at 205. 
Although the reasonableness of I.C. § 49-808(2) is not a proper consideration in 
view of the statute's plain language, Verska, 151 Idaho at 893,5 it is worth noting that 
the plain meaning of Section 48-808(2) is not absurd. For example, if Mr. Brooks had 
been pulled over on the shoulder of Interstate 84 and then wanted to get back in a travel 
5 In Verska, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that, "If the statute as written is 
socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judiciaL" Verska, 
151 Idaho at 893. 
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lane, he would have been on a controlled-access highway in a parked position and 
would therefore have had to give a signal for five seconds before legally turning onto the 
travel lane. (See Tr., Aug. 16,2012, pAO, L15 - pA1, L1.) 
Pursuant to the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute, 
a five-second signal must be given only when the person giving the signal is both (1) on 
a controlled-access highway and (2) turning from a parked position. I.C. § 49-808(2). 
U[I]n all other instances," the signal must be given "for not less than the last one hundred 
(100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." Id. The above interpretation of the 
Section 49-808(2) is the only reasonable interpretation of the language of the statute, 
and thus the statute is unambiguous. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 896. 
By interpreting the statute so as to require a five-second signal when the person 
giving the signal is only "on a controlled-access highway" without also requiring that the 
person be "turning from a parked position" (see R., p.88), the district court ignored the 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the language of Section 49-808(2). The district 
court essentially substituted "or" for "and" in the phrase "[o]n controlled-access 
highways and before turning from a parked position," transforming "the phrase into one 
that is disjunctive rather than conjunctive." See Brink, 117 Idaho at 57. However, a 
district court may not perform that type of "open sentence surgery" on the "[h]ealthy 
language" of an unambiguous statute. See id. at 56-57. 
Under the correct interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2), Mr. Brooks did not commit a 
violation of the statute. When Mr. Brooks made the lane change, he was not both (1) on 
a controlled-access highway and (2) turning from a parked position, and thus he was 
not required by I.C. § 49-808(2) to signal for not less than five seconds. In fact, 
Mr. Brooks complied with the "all other instances" language of § 49-808(2), because he 
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signaled for approximately 160 feet. (See R., p.85 & n.1.) Mr. Brooks therefore did not 
violate I.C. § 49-808(2). 
Because Mr. Brooks did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2), Trooper Higley did not have 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify initiating the traffic stop. Trooper 
Higley testified that the sole reason for the stop was because Mr. Brooks had violated 
I.C. § 49-808(2) by not signaling for five seconds. Without the violation of Section 49-
808(2), the trooper had no grounds for initiating the stop. Thus, the stop was not 
justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception. 
D. If I.C. § 49-808(2) Is Ambiguous, It Should Be Interpreted In Favor Of Mr. Brooks 
Under The Rule Of Lenity 
Should this Court disagree with Mr. Brooks' assertion that I.C. § 49-808(2) is 
unambiguous and instead determine that the statute is ambiguous, then Mr. Brooks 
asserts that Section 49-808(2) should be interpreted in his favor under the rule of lenity. 
If the statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor, he did not violate the statute and the 
stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception. 
"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one 
reasonable construction." Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. "The rule of lenity requires that 
ambiguous criminal statutes should be read narrowly and be construed in favor of the 
defendant." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947 (Ct. App. 2011). "[T]his rule does not 
require a court to disregard the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the context." 
Id. (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 766 (Ct. App. 1989)). "[I]n Idaho infractions are 
deemed criminal offenses for purposes of both constitutional and statutory analysis." 
State v. George, 127 Idaho 693,698 (1995). 
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The rule of lenity is applicable here because the purpose of the statute is not 
clear from the context. See Jones, 151 Idaho at 947; Hale, 116 Idaho at 766. Although 
I.C. § 49-808(1) requires "an appropriate signal" before making the enumerated 
alternative movements, neither it nor the rest of the statute indicate that the clear 
purpose of Section 49-808 is to designate a five-second signal as the appropriate signal 
for drivers on controlled-access highways. See Hale, 116 Idaho at 766. Thus, if this 
Court determines that I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, the statute should be interpreted 
in favor of Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. If Section 49-808(2) is interpreted in 
Mr. Brooks' favor, he did not violate the statute and the stop was not justified by 
reasonable suspicion at its inception. 
E. Trooper Higley's Misapprehension Of I.C. § 49-808(2) Was A Mistake Of Law 
That Rendered The Stop Per Se Unreasonable 
No matter whether I.C. § 49-808(2) is unambiguous or ambiguous, Mr. Brooks 
did not commit a violation of the statute. As discussed above, Trooper Higley's sole 
reason for the stop was his belief that Mr. Brooks had violated the statute, based on his 
misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2). Mr. Brooks asserts that Trooper Higley's 
misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law, and his mistake of law 
rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
Whether an officer's mistake of law renders a detention per se unreasonable 
appears to be a question of first impression in Idaho. See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 
300, 303-04 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 58 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 125 (Ct. App. 1999). 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Brooks submits that Trooper Higley's 
misapprehension of I.C. § 49-808(2) was solely a mistake of law. While the line 
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between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law "is not always easy to draw," Horton, 
150 Idaho at 303, the trooper's mistake here was one of law. Unlike the officer in 
McCarthy, who "was mistaken about the fact of the speed limit sign's location and about 
the law regarding the speed limit applicable," McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125 (emphasis in 
original), Trooper Higley was only mistaken about the law regarding the signaling 
requirements applicable to Mr. Brooks. Further, Mr. Brooks acknowledged that he was 
on a controlled-access highway, and there are no factual disputes about his location or 
his conduct while driving. (See R., p.SS.) The mistake here was on the law generally 
regarding when a five-second signal must be made. Cf. Horton, 150 Idaho at 304 ("His 
mistake was not the law generally regarding a repossession agent plate or its legal 
existence, but whether, in fact, the plate on this vehicle was a designated repossession 
plate. . .. [W]e conclude that the mistake at issue was primarily one of fact, not one of 
law."). Thus, Trooper Higley's misapprehension of the statute was solely a mistake 
of law. 
Mr. Brooks asserts that an officer's mistake of law should render a detention per 
se unreasonable, i.e., invalidate a search or seizure. This is the majority view taken by 
those federal and state courts that have directly addressed the issue. See United 
States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 95S, 961-62 (yth Gir. 2006) ("We agree with the majority 
of circuits to have considered the issue that a police officer's mistake of law cannot 
support probable cause to conduct a stop."); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 
1139 (10th Gir. 2005) (remanding a case for the district court to determine whether an 
officer's belief that the law had been violated "was correct, a reasonable mistake of fact, 
or an impermissible mistake of law"); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 
1277-S0 (11 th Gir. 2003) ("[A] mistake of law cannot provide reasonable suspicion or 
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probable cause to justify a traffic stop."); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 
1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States V. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999); 
State V. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 652-54 (Iowa 2010); People V. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 
81, 88 (III. App. Ct. 2007); Gordon V. State, 901 So. 2d 399, 405 (Fla. Dist. App. 2005); 
People V. Smith, 767 N'y.S.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); People V. Glick, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 315, 319 (Ct. App. 1988); see also United States V. Gross, 550 F.3d 578, 580 n.2 
(6th Cir. 2008) ("[W}e note that the vast majority of our sister circuits to decide this issue 
have concluded that an officer's mistake of law, even if made in good faith, cannot 
provide grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, because an officer's 
mistake of law can never be objectively reasonable."); United States V. Coplin, 463 F.3d 
96, 101 (1 st Cir. 2006) ("Stops premised on a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-
faith mistake, are generally held to be unconstitutionaL"). See generally Wayne A. 
Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 Emory L.J. 69 (2011); Daniel N. Haas, Comment, 
Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of Fact During Traffic Stops, 
62 DePaul L. Rev. 1035 (2013). 
However, a minority of courts have taken the other approach, holding that an 
officer's mistake of law, like a mistake of fact, can be objectively reasonable. See 
United States V. Martin, 411 F.3d 998,1001 (8th Cir. 2005); Hinojosa V. State, 319 
S.W.3d 258, 262-64 (Ark. 2009); State V. Barnard, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (N.C. 2008); 
Harrison V. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1139 (Miss. 2001); People V. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. 
315, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also United States V. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 
1359 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that, under the facts, it was objectively reasonable for the 
officers to suspect that a defendant's license plate was displayed in violation of the law, 
even assuming they were mistaken that the law required display of the front plate on the 
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bumper); United States v. Deflin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that, 
although an officer made a mistake of law by misunderstanding the scope of a traffic 
law, because the officer's traffic stop was still objectively grounded in existing law, the 
officer's subjective understanding of the law was irrelevant). 
Mr. Brooks submits that this Court should adopt the majority approach and hold 
that an officer's mistake of law renders a detention per se unreasonable.6 "The 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United States v. Knights, 534 
U,S. 112, 118 (2001). While officers have "broad leeway to conduct searches and 
seizures regardless of whether their subjective intent corresponds to the legal 
justification for their actions ... the legal justification must be objectively grounded." 
United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). A detention based on a 
mistake of law is not objectively grounded. As the Seventh Circuit put it, U[a]n officer 
cannot have a reasonable belief that a violation of the law occurred when the acts to 
which an officer points as supporting probable cause are not prohibited by law." 
McDonald, 453 F.3d at 961. U[F]ai/ure to understand the law by the very person 
charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable." Tibbetts, 396 F.3d at 1138 
(emphasis in original). 
6 Adopting the majority approach would accord with the Idaho Supreme Court's 
rejection of a ugood-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule under Article I, § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution. See State V. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012); State V. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 981 (1992). The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently 
invalidated search warrant, as well as evidence obtained in some other situations. 
United States V. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see Koivu, 152 Idaho at 514-15. In 
Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected applying the Leon good-faith exception to 
Article I, Section 17. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981. In Koivu, the Idaho Supreme Court 
declined to overrule Guzman, noting that, "In some instances, we have construed Article 
I, section 17, to provide greater protection than is provided by the United States 
Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth Amendment." Koivu, 152 Idaho at 519. 
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Invalidating searches and seizures based on an officer's mistake of law would 
also preserve the exclusionary rule. As the Ninth Circuit explained when it rejected a 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for officers who do not act in accordance 
with governing law: "To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they 
properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey." Lopez-Soto, 
205 F.3d at 1106. Similarly, while the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "a traffic infraction 
can justify a stop even where the police officer made the stop for a reason other than 
the occurrence of the traffic infraction," it concluded that "if officers are allowed to stop 
vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated even 
where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic 
infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights 
excessive." Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289. The Eleventh Circuit noted "the 
fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse,' Bryan v. United States, [524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998)], while allowing 
those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to be ignorant of it." Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 
at 1280. 
Additionally, holding that mistakes of law render a detention per se unreasonable 
would maintain the separation of powers. If an officer's mistake of law were reasonable 
(and a detention therefore valid) through any sort of ambiguity in a statute, validating the 
detention would essentially "sweep behavior into the statute which the authors of the 
statute may have had in mind but failed to put into the plain language of the statute." 
See Canthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1278. Thus, law enforcement officers, part of the 
executive branch, would basically be able to usurp the lawmaking powers of the 
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legislature. A holding that mistakes of law render a detention per se unreasonable 
would not so threaten the lawmaking powers of the legislative branch, and would 
therefore maintain the separation of powers. 
In sum, an officer's mistake of law renders a detention per se unreasonable. A 
detention based on a mistake of law is not objectively grounded. Also, holding that 
mistakes of law render a detention per se unreasonable would preserve the 
exclusionary rule and maintain the separation of powers. Thus, Trooper Higley's 
misapprehension of I.e. § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law, and his mistake of law 
rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
Because the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, the 
stop violated Mr. Brooks' constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. I.e. § 49-808(2) is an unambiguous statute 
which requires that a driver be both on a control/ed-access highway and turning from a 
parked position before the five-second signal requirement applies. Because Mr. Brooks 
did not violate the plain language of Section 49-808(2), and Trooper Higley offered no 
other reason for initiating the stop, the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at 
its inception. Alternatively, if I.e. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in 
favor of Mr. Brooks. If the statute is interpreted in Mr. Brooks' favor, he did not violate 
the statute and the stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception. In 
any event, Trooper Higley's misapprehension of Section 49-808(2) was a mistake of law 
that rendered the stop per se unreasonable. 
Thus, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be suppressed. See 
Bishop, 146 Idaho 810. The district court therefore erred when it denied Mr. Brooks' 
motion to suppress. The district court's order of probation on withheld judgment should 
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be vacated, the district court's order denying the motion to suppress should be 
reversed, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court's order of probation on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's 
order denying the motion to suppress, and remand the case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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